TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS AND THEIR OFFICERS
FLEMIG JAM~ES, JR.t NDER THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE in this country neither the state nor the federal government is liable for torts committed in its service by its officers and employees unless it consents to such liability; the officer or employee, however, may be individually liable. This removes at once a very substantial area of injury-producing activity from the operation of forces which have tended to make much of our tort law a vehicle for distributing the loss suffered by the victims of enterprise among the beneficiaries of the enterprise.-The expansion of the activities of government during recent decades points up sharply the striking character of this exceptional immunity from liability of one of the best loss-distributing agencies in our society.
Strong pressures have inevitably been at work to push back this immunity, 2 and these pressures have had measurable success. Further inroads upon the immunity are likely and desirable. Yet the position and functions of government are to a certain extent unique, and we may never want them to be treated altogether like those of private enterprise.
Here we shall examine something of the bases in history, reasoning, and policy of the immunity; sketch its present status in the United States and recent developments in the field; and suggest the possible courses of future development. Inextricably interwoven with all these matters is the question of individual liability of government officers and employees. This, too, will be treated; and something of the interconnection among the problems will be suggested.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
'Consult Gregory, Trespass to Nuisance to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951) ; James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 Yale L. J. 549 (1948) ; Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951) .
2The scholar whose work spearheaded this pressure was Edwin M. Borchard. A comprehensive critical review of the whole subject matter herein dealt with appears in Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) ; Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928) . Recognition of Borchard's role may be seen in Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942) .
I. BASES IN HISTORY, REASONING, AND POLICY

1.
History. Whether governmental immunity had roots in Roman law is a question that need not detain us here. 3 American notions were largely the product of English developments which trace back to the position of the king in medieval times, and then to his identification with the concept of "sovereignty" which arose during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 4 At least from the time of Edward I, the king was not suable in his own courts as a matter of right.' This was not the result of any metaphysical notion of the king's "sovereignty." No feudal lord could be sued of right in his own court. "That the King as chief of the feudal system had no court above him, in which he could be held liable, as the feudal lords could be in his, was the result rather of accident than theory." ' The king was thought to be human and fallible, and subject to God and the law, but not suable on earth for want of an appropriate temporal court to entertain the suit. It was not until after the breakdown of feudalism that the king became identified with the state and the theory of sovereignty was fashioned to clothe the king-state entity. Here, in the days of the later Tudors and Stuarts in England and of Louis XIII and XIV in France, the days of Bodin and Hobbes7 "we are plunged into talk about kings who do not die, who are never under age, who are ubiquitous, who do no wrong and (says Blackstone) think no wrong; and such talk has not been innocuous."" The ancient maxim that "the King can do no wrong" took on new meaning and came to stand for a notion that the sovereign was incapable of doing wrong. This was a substantive ground of immunity in addition to the mere lack of a court with power to enforce remedies against the king.
Just how an immunity which had its roots in feudalism and in a political philosophy associated with the divine right of kings was transplanted to the new republic in America remains something of a mystery.? 0 Yet it seems to have been generally applied in favor of both the states and the federal government without much discussion as part of the existing order of things." To be sure, dissenting voices prevailed on one occasion; 2 but this was quickly followed by the Eleventh Amendment.' 3 Since then the doctrine that neither a state nor the United States is liable in tort without its consent has been generally accepted.
Bases in Reasoning and
Policy. In a famous dictum, Mr. Justice Holmes said " [a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. "' 4 Of course, those who wield the ultimate political power in a society do have it in their hands to determine whether or not that society shall be under corporate liability to its individual members. But the absence of "legal right" The heavy indebtedness of the states and their precarious financial condition during the years immediately after the Revolution no doubt played a part in this. Watkins 52-54. Compare Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions against the Federal Government, 47 Col. L. Rev. 722 (1947) . Consult also Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1432 Rev. , 1436 Rev. (1954 .
""While the political theory that the King can do no wrong was repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented was invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied by our courts as vigorously as it had been on behalf of the Crown." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) ; see also authorities cited note 10 supra.
yet (it is devoutly to be hoped) the taxpaying public does, and it is the taxpaying public which would bear the costs of government tort liability.
Few, if any, scholars and commentators could be found today to defend the full extent of governmental immunity. 6 On the other hand, no one today urges that a judicial remedy be given for all the injuries that may result from mistaken governmental action, or that the courts should decide when governmental action of a political nature is mistaken. 2 7 The proper sphere of governmental immunity will remain a vital question even under systems which relax the indefensibly broad immunity which still prevails in most of our states. Before we reach an analysis of this problem, however, we should examine the prevailing rules.
II.
TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1. The State. So far as the general rule goes, little can be added to what has been said. The state without its consent is not liable for the torts of its agents, officers, and employees even though they are acting in its service at the time the tort is committed. Questions naturally arise, however, as to how it may consent and whether the rule has exceptions.
The state may consent to liability by statute. 2 " This seems not to be ' Consult, e.g., Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, 36 Yale L. J. 757, 802 et seq., 1039, 1097, et seq. (1927) ; Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform, 11 A.B.A.J. 495 (1925) ; Symposium on Government Tort Liability, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 179 (1942) ; Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions against the Federal Government, 47 Col. L. Rev. 722 (1947) ; Schwartz 302; Street 185; Watkins c. 12.
Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944), and in Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 29 (1950) ; Carter, J., dissenting in Madison v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Calif. App. 232, 236 P. 2d 141 (1951) ; Wolfe, J., dissenting in Bingham v. Board of Ed., 118 Utah 582, 593, 223 P. 2d 432, 438 (1950) .
'Consult, e.g., Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, 34 Yale L. J. 1 (1924) ; Gelihorn and Schenck, op. cit. supra note 26 at 739; Smith, op. cit. supra note 25 at 52; Schwartz 298-302 (pointing out, however, that the French law recently has allowed recovery in such cases under some circumstances, but suggesting that the notion is "an indirect way to accomplish what the American courts can do directly through their authority to declare statutes unconstitutional"). Compare Street 74 ("Most French jurists would support the continuance of actes de gouvernement" for which the state is not liable "in a restricted form on the ground that it is a necessary condition of harmony between the Administration and the judiciary"). doubted, 29 at least where the statute is general, outlining for the future the conditions of liability. Where an injury has already been done, the American practice has been to seek relief by private act of the legislature; and such bills have often been enacted, 3 " although such an enactment, on occasion, has been held unconstitutional. 3 Only the legislature, or the authority that may make or alter the constitution, may give effective consent to a suit against the state. Neither an executive board 3 2 nor the attorney general 33 may do so unless authorized by a statute or constitutional provision. 4 Some fairly recent cases have raised the question whether the purchase of liability insurance by a governmental body constitutes a waiver of its immunity. Most of them have decided that it does not, at least in the absence of statutory authority to purchase the insurance. 85 Some cases have exonerated the governmental unit even in the face of 'Benson v. State Hospital Comm'n, 316 Mich. 66, 25 N.W. 2d 112 (1946) State, 73 Calif. 29, 14 Pac. 610 (1887) (claim that such legislation an improper "gift" noted, but not passed on).
The above rulings of unconstitutionality all concerned special acts allowing individual suit. Special appropriation acts are "the most prevalent and most objectionable means of dealing with the problem," and rarely succumb to constitutional challenge. Nutting, op. cit. supra note 30 at 16, 17. 'Farish v. State Banking Bd., 235 U.S. 498 (1915) ; Metropolitan Tr. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 220 N.Y. 344, 115 N.E. 1000 (1917 Lankford v. Schroeder, 47 Okla. 279, 147 Pac. 1049 (1915 . 'Bow v. Plummer, 79 N.H. 23, 104 Atl. 35 (1918) ; Morrah v. Dr. John De La Howe Ind. School, 120 S.C. 197, 113 S.E. 70 (1922) (state may "be sued only by permission granted; that permission can be granted only by the General Assembly.... The Attorney General ... has not the power to ... consent to such suit"). , 200 U.S. 273 (1906); McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 489, 149 N.W. 593 (1914) . 'Ritmiller v. School Dist. No. 84, 104 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn., 1952) Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E. 2d 195 (1950); Kesman v. Fallowfield Township School Dist., 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. 2d 17 (1942) Comm'rs, 67 Minn. 412, 70 N.W. 6 (1897) (maintenance of dam so as to deprive lower riparian of natural flow). Other cases have criticized these holdings for failing to appreciate the difference between a municipal corporation (which is freely suable though it is not always liable where a private corporation would be) and those quasi-corporations (counties, school districts, etc.) which are created without their voluntary action as mere political subdivisions of the state to perform some of its functions. School Dist. v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 Pac. 609 (1926) ; Zoll v. St. Louis County, 343 Mo. 1031 , 124 S.W. 2d 1168 (1938 .
The last-mentioned cases certainly support an argument for the state's immunity here. On the other hand there seems to be no basis for distinguishing between the substantive liability (as distinct from any question of suability) of the state and of a municipality exercising governmental functions. Cases holding cities liable may therefore furnish support for the state's liability in a parallel situation, and cases holding counties and school districts liable bolster the availability of municipal cases for this purpose.
I Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879); Watkins 78 et seq.; Nichols 451. In Pennsylvania, compensation for the taking of unimproved land for highways is a condition which would be a nuisance if a private person created or maintained it. 4 " Virtually all the state constitutions, however, forbid the taking of private property for public purposes without compensation, 41 and many of these constitutions forbid both the taking and the damaging 4 of such property. Most courts have held these provisions to be self-executing, so that even where the legislature fails to provide a procedure for prosecuting such claims against the state, an action may be maintained in the courts to recover compensation whenever there has been a taking or (where that suffices) a damaging of property in the constitutional sense. 3 The last-mentioned decisions invite the inquiry whether the injury complained of amounts to such a taking, or damaging. The intentional and authorized appropriation of property would, of course, constitute a "taking," but this much is not required. It is enough that defendant's conduct destroys or substantially impairs the use of plaintiff's property either permanently or for a protracted period, as where guns are continually fired over a summer resort 4 or heavy bombers are continually flown within a hundred feet above a chicken farm. 5 Consequential damage, however, such as the increased expenses of regarded as a matter of grace rather than constitutional right, as six per cent was added to all the deeds to the original proprietors, for highway purposes. See, e.g., M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 362 (1802); Snively v. Washington Township, 218 Pa. 249, 254, 67 Atl. 465, 467 (1907 S. 256 (1946) , in which the Court was driven either to find a taking or to deny relief, because of the unavailability of recovering on a nuisance theory at least before the Federal Tort Claims Act. Consult notes, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1252 Rev. (1945 41 ll. L. Rev. 562 (1946) . Consult also Reed v. State, 108 N.Y. 407, 15 N.E. 735 (1888) (where such liability was imposed by virtue of a statute).
The state may also authorize a municipality to do acts in furtherance of a public project which would amount to a nuisance if done by an individual. In such a case the municipality will not be liable unless the legislature so provides. Northern Tr. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) .
', Citations are collected in 2 Nichols at 240-41.
"Ibid. Consult also ibid., § 6.44. 'Rose v. State, 19 Calif. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505 (1942) ; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931); note, 2 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948) . Contra: Zoll v. St. Louis County, 343 Mo. 1031 , 124 S.W. 2d 1168 (1938 .
" Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) . 'United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) , noted 35 Calif. L. Rev. 110 (1947); 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1252 (1945 ; 41 Ill. L. Rev. 562 (1946) ; 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 224 (1946) . Other examples of nonphysical taking may be found in 2 Nichols § § 6.3, 6.31; compare ibid., § 6.32. [Vol 22
protecting a railroad embankment from high water, 4 6 or the loss of "head" for water power, 47 are not included.
Under constitutional provisions for compensation for damaging property, 48 recovery may be had for consequential damage which would have been recoverable against an individual if he had caused it 9 and also for special and peculiar damage by way of "some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner of... land enjoys in connection with his property and which gives it an additional value."-50 A typical example is the damage caused to abutting property by the change of grade of a highway. The public project must involve injury to plaintiff's property as an intended or at least necessary consequence of its prosecution, or else the injury must result from a continuous course of conduct amounting to a nuisance. 5 The latter "axe only sovereign and only immune in so far as they represent the state; ... their immunity, like their sovereignty, is in a sense borrowed ... [but] the state is inherently sovereign at all times and in every capacity." 5 While this reasoning is a logical enough deduction from the premises assumed, yet, as previously indicated, the whole matter of sovereign immunity is so questionable from the points of view of history, comparative law, and policy, that any application of the notion which extends rather than cuts down immunity may be and has been questioned. 5 " And the expansion of government-accelerated during the present century-into activities which were formerly left largely to private enterprise which had to pay for its torts should not prevent the victims of those activities from obtaining the compensation they otherwise would have had. As the California court has recently said, considerations of embarrassment and expense to the state "are no longer persuasive in relation to an industrial or business enterprise which by itself may be looked to for the discharge of all appropriate demands and expenses growing out of operations." 5
If the state sets up a corporation to carry out some of its functions, it may endow the corporation with its own immunity, 60 although of course it need not; 6 ' if it does not do so affirmatively, the corporation will be liable just as any agent of the state would be. 62 If the state acquires stock in an existing corporation, the latter does not become endowed with immunity. 6 3 ' Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 334-35, 123 Pac. 450, 452 (1912) . 'People v. Superior Court, 29 Calif. 2d 754, 178 P. 2d 1 (1947) (making the distinction and holding the state for negligent operation of its railroad) ; Guidi v. State, 41 Calif. 2d 623, 262 P. 2d 3 (1953) Co., 370 Pa. 400, 88 A. 2d 413 (1952) (where obstruction of one highway necessarily caused by work done pursuant to contract with state in constructing another, contractor's only duty is one of care to prevent obstruction from being unreasonably prolonged. Dissent on ground that on facts of this case delay was unreasonably long). ' Trigg v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 30 Tenn. App. 672, 680, 209 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (1947) (holding federal government's contractor for defective condition of highway caused by it).
Cases in which the contractor has been held for his negligence in the course of performing work for a governmental body include State Const. Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 62 S.E. 2d 413 (1950) ; Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S.v. 2d 557 (1930) (overruling former cases which had exempted contractor on grounds that this would lessen expense of such contracts to the government. An excellent opinion); Stiers v. Mayhall, 207 Okla. 219, 248 P. 2d 1047 (1952 [Vol. 22 ness of governmental immunity. 9 The earlier cases, however, seem to have imposed-rather than withheld-liability without regard to the distinction, 8° which first made its way into prominence in the mid-nineteenth-century case of Bailey v. City of New York." 1 It may have reflected in part the distinction between public and private corporations which had been developed for the entirely different purpose of determining which entities were entitled to "the protection of the obligation of contracts" against legislative modification. 82 However that may be, the present distinction is commonly rationalized by saying that the municipality is the agent or representative of the state in performing governmental functions and so shares the state's immunity, but that it has no sovereignty and no immunity of its own.' So far as policy reasons go, those offered for the state's immunity are generally repeated but with special emphasis on the fear of municipal bankruptcy. 4 No satisfactory test has been devised for distinguishing governmental from proprietary functions.
8 5 The state legislature has wide powers to determine the nature of a duty which it imposes or a privilege which it confers upon a municipal corporation. 8 But the legislature rarely speci-"I Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations § 111 (5th ed., 1911) (hereafter cited as Dillon).
' Authorities cited note 78 supra; Lloyd, op. cit. supra note 71. Rev. 360 (1942) (concluding, at 376: "In no instance . . . is the present cost excessively great, and in no instance does it appear that the abolition of immunity would raise the cost to a prohibitive figure"). ' See authorities cited notes 72 supra and 94 infra. Middletown, 187 N.Y. 37, 46, 79 N.E. 863, 866 (1907) (maintenance of highways: "If, in investing the municipality with the duty, the legislature should regard its performance as partaking of a governmental nature and should relieve it of responsibility for breaches, could it properly be said to have violated any constitutional rights of the citizens? I think not") ; Stocker v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S.W. 2d 339 (1939) App., 1936) .
The statute in the Abbott and Stocker cases expressly excluded liability; that in Van ies whether a function is to be governmental or proprietary, and, where it gives no clear guide, the courts resort to one or more of several criteria in making the determination. Those most often invoked are (1) whether the function is allocated to the municipality for its profit or special advantage or whether for the purpose of carrying out the public functions of the state without special advantage to the city 7 and (2) whether the function is one historically performed by government. " [I] t is only where the duty is a new one, and is such as is ordinarily performed by trading corporations, that an intention to give a private action for a neglect in its performance is to be presumed." 8 8 These criteria are elusive and unsatisfactory. All the functions of a municipality are-or should be-for the public benefit. They are none the less so because they serve directly and primarily only a limited segment of the public rather than all the people of the state. To the extent that cities are instrumentalities of the state, their main function is to serve the state's purposes locally." 9 The fact that the municipality makes a charge or a profit in connection with the service rendered has often been considered; 9 0 but functions have been held governmental Gilder did not, but declared that the acquisition, operation, etc., of airports were to be "public and governmental functions." Other cases have interpreted similar language as making an airport a public purpose only to authorize public expenditures, etc. Rhodes v. ' In a much-quoted passage, the Massachusetts court has said, "The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit." Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 390, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1917) . Ashbury v. Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 288, 147 S.E. 223, 226 (1929) ; 18 McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.29 (3d ed., 1949) 
(hereafter cited as McQuillin).
Cf. Cowin & Co. v. Merrill, 202 Wis. 614, 233 N.W. 561 (1930) . ' Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 369 (1877) (the statement was confined to functions which served the public benefit and not the pecuniary advantage of the municipality), quoted in 4 Dillon § 1643.
' Take the cases of fire protection and education for examples of functions which are universally regarded as governmental. The direct benefits enure fairly exclusively to the local citizens. Wider public benefits there undoubtedly are in a most important sense but they come as a consequence of conferring the benefit upon local people and local property. See also analysis in Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, 34 Yale L. J. 129, 136 (1924) .
" Beard v. San Francisco, 79 Calif. App. 2d 753, 180 P. 2d 744 (1947); Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917) (city not liable for "gratuitous performance of strictly public functions .. . from which is derived no special corporate advantage, no pecuniary profit, and no enforced contribution from individuals particularly benefited").
Cf. Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 P. 2d 156 (1947) , where the fact that a fee was charged for entrance to a city swimming pool was considered but not treated as [Vol. 22 in spite of a charge,"' and functions have been held proprietary where there is neither charge nor profit. 2 The historical test is a suggestive guide though a faltering one. Many of the functions now generally considered governmental were privately performed in the not very distant past. 9 3 Little wonder that courts 9 4 and commentators" have despaired of finding a rational and consistent key to the distinction. Yet it has remained as part of our American law, and lawyers and courts are faced with the practical problem of applying it. The only safe guides are precedent and the underlying attitude toward contraction or expansion of municipal liability with which the problem is approached. 9 " conclusive. Nor was the fact that the city incurred a deficit on the whole operation, which was held proprietary on all the facts in the case. Compare authorities cited note 108 infra. Yet the planning of sewers (... as opposed to the operation and upkeep of sewers) and the collection and disposal of garbage and ashes are all but universally regarded as governmental. The London police force was not established until 1829. It is not a hundred years since fire companies were generally private and voluntary." " Consult, e.g., Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939 Even where a function is proprietary the municipality may have a choice of whether it will undertake the function at all and how such undertaking will be made. Some of the choices are clearly discretionary ones of a political or legislative kind. No liability, for instance, should attach to the failure to make an affirmative choice to acquire or construct a utility, or to extend its services. This, it is submitted, is the only proper application (in this connection) of the notion that a municipality is not liable for nonfeasance. 0 9 The municipality is also properly exempted from liability for the consequences of broadly choosing to perform a proprietary function one way rather than another, e.g., to carry utility wires overhead rather than in underground conduits, or to buy power from existing plants rather than to erect new ones. Once 
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these broad policy decisions have been made, however, the municipality should be held accountable to the same extent as a private enterprise would be for the adoption of a plan or design (in carrying out the project) which is unreasonably dangerous by the ordinary tests of negligence." 0 A good many decisions are consistent with the view here set forth. But some courts, unwarrantably it is believed, have refused to hold a municipality liable for the adoption of an unsafe subordinate plan or design on the ground that this involves the exercise of discretion,"' or have been willing to do so only where the condition produced "is so manifestly dangerous that a court upon the facts can say, as a matter of law, that it was dangerous and unsafe."" ' Even under this "general rule," "exceptions" are numerous. There will be liability, for instance, for negligent execution of the plan, or for negligent maintenance of the highway or sewer so that defects develop, or for failure to secure competent advice in adopting the plan as the sources cited above show. And some cases hold the city for conditions attributable to the original plan after an experimental period. Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 9 S.E. 2d 356 (1940) . 'Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kan. 485, 493, 4 Pac. 822, 827 (1884) These rules which apply a standard of conduct variant from that of ordinary care are reminiscent of earlier, now generally discarded, rules exonerating an industry of negligence if it adopted customary devices and methods, or plans which had the approval of respectable expert opinion, Even with respect to functions which fall within the proprietary class, the municipality is not liable for acts which are wholly ultra vires; 113 but this notion does not shield it from liability for negligent or other tortious acts done in the course of activities within the municipality's general power." 4 Where injury is caused in the performance of a governmental function the municipality may nevertheless be liable for the torts of its officers where these involve either a taking 1 5 or a direct trespass to real estate, 11 6 or the creation or maintenance of a nuisance." 1 7 The concept of nuisance here includes a condition which entails unreasonable danger to persons exercising a public right, such as the use of highways, or public schools or parks." 8 Streets and Sidewalks. Municipalities in this country are generally subject to liability today for injuries caused by defects in highways within their borders." 9 The bases of liability, however, differ among the jurisdictions. In New England and a few other states there was no common-law liability on the part of any political subdivision (including the town) for such injuries. 2 0 In these states today such liability rests entirely upon statute" unless the condition amounts to a nuisance created or maintained by the town. 2 .' 2 The rule of liability here must be regarded as an "illogical exception" to the general rule of municipal nonliability for negligence in the performance of governmental duties.' 2 7 If such an "exception" to an unfortunate "rule" needs justification, it may be found in pragmatic considerations 2 which have been reflected in the well-nigh uni- (2) Dillon's judgment is that "the doctrine works well and is just, since no stimulus to the performance of duty is more effectual than the wholesale fear of the verdict of a jury for damages." 4 Dillon § 1714. McQuillin concludes: "It is fully vindicated by the decisions and has found a firm place as a sound and wholesome rule of law in American jurisprudence." 19 McQuillin § 54.04 .
The admonitory effect of tort liability generally may be subject to question. See James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950) ; text at note 252 infra. In the present situation it will be at its strongest because (a) the pressure of liability is put on the party strategically placed to avoid conditions of danger; (b) other incentives to safety are peculiarly lacking here. The city and its employees do not stand to suffer personal injury or property damage from highway defects. Liability aside, the risk is pretty one-sided.
versal legislative rejection of the "logical rule." ' 2 9 The main practical difference today between the New England and the more general rules lies in the strictness with which the courts under the former insist on complete and literal compliance with all statutory conditions.1
30
The state and its subdivisions (e.g., counties) have widely been regarded as immune from liability for defective highway conditions in the absence of a statute imposing such liability.' 3 ' In states which imply municipal liability, this often means that a plaintiff's chance of recovery depends on whether he was hurt inside or outside the city line-an anomaly which has rarely been justified 32 and is receding in importance with the growth of statutes imposing liability and the recent judicial trend to minimize the distinctions between municipal and quasicorporations.
33
The requirements for a recovery against a municipality for injury from a highway defect-whether under a statute creating such liability or under the implication of such liability from the power to control highways-are commonly as follows:
(a) A condition of the highway which renders it unreasonably unsafe for ordinary travel, 4 Dillon thought that there "may be after all ... a substantial difference not readily perceived" in the greater efficiency of cities, so that the distinction was "easier to feel than to unfold and define," 4 Dillon § 1716, but either this has been too nebulous for most critics, or their feelings led them to a different conclusion. 40 Among the circumstances to be considered are the amount and type of travel to be expected, the general nature of the locality, and the time of year. As the Connecticut court said, "[it depends on a great variety of circumstances, which it is impracticable to group together into a legal proposition. A better and safer condition of roads may reasonably be expected and required in the summer than in spring or winter; in populous cities than in unfrequented districts. Much may depend upon the means at command, upon general usage, upon the question whether the defect is the result of a sudden accident or has been long neg-
The defect may be a result of the plan or design under which the highway was constructed or repaired,' 42 although some courts refuse to impose liability if the plan has been adopted in the good-faith exercise of judgment as long as "reasonable men might differ as to which plan should have been adopted." 43 Occasional holdings have excluded liability as a matter of law for "minor defects," such as an obstruction two or three inches above the sidewalk level, or a hole of similar depth.' 44 This represents the adoption of fixed standards of conduct in a way that is generally disappearnecessarily cease to be a traveler simply because he pauses momentarily, as to look at a store window. [Vol. 22
TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS ing from our law. The persistence of such vestigial rulings in this area is an indication of judicial reluctance to impose liability on cities. Some courts have rejected such a mechanical rule. 145 To be a defect, the condition need not be within the traveled or paved portion of the roadway. Liability will be imposed if it is an unreasonable threat to some of the reasonably foreseeable incidents of travel. 14 Moreover, a road or sidewalk may be unsafe because of the dangerous proximity of an excavation or other danger outside the highway limits, unless reasonable precautions (e.g., a fence or barrier) are taken to prevent injury. 147 (b) The municipality must have had knowledge of or reasonable means of learning about the defect, long enough before the accident so that by exercising due care it could have remedied the defect. 4 8 The municipality's duty is not to assure the absence of highway defects, but simply to use due care to prevent or remedy them. If the defect has been created by the municipality this requirement is met, without more. But in the commoner case where the defect is due to natural causes, or disrepair, or the act of a third person, the plaintiff must show (1) either that the city knew of the defect, or would have known of it if it had made the kind of inspection reasonable care required, 4 9 and (2) ' ... Knowledge may be evidenced by showing that the condition was pointed out to a city employee having the duty to report it (e.g., policeman assigned to beat where defect was); that the city had taken some steps indicating knowledge of the defect, etc., see Weed v. Balston Spa, 76 N.Y. 329 (1879) (village trustee); Pace v. Webster, 138 Iowa 107, 115 N.W. 888 (1908) (street commissioner). Reasonable means of knowledge is commonly evidenced by showing that the defect was obvious or reasonably discoverable and that it had existed for a long enough period of time so that it should have been discovered if the city had been reasonably vigilant. Consult, e.g., cases cited note, 13 A.L.R. 2d 922, 933 (1950) ; and, on the general problems of proof in similar situations, James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 Va. L. Rev. 179, 190-93 (1951) . Cf., e.g., Ledbetter v. Great Falls, 123 Mont. 270, 213 P. 2d 246 (1949) (issuance of permit for excavation near sidewalk charges city with notice that condition may become dangerous for want of lights, barriers, etc.) ; and consult note, 13 A.L.R. 2d 922 (1950) .
1955]
after this actual or constructive knowledge it had an opportunity to remedy or repair the defect by the exercise of care which was reasonable under all the circumstances. 5 0 These will include the nature of the problem facing the city, the means at hand, what is usual and customary, and the like.' 5 ' If a storm causes widespread conditions of danger, for example, a city can hardly be expected to remedy any given defect as quickly as under normal conditions. 1 52 (3) The defect must be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 5 3 For the most part the same rules are applied here as elsewhere. 5 4 But in Connecticut and Massachusetts the courts have added the unfortunate gloss that the defect must be the sole proximate cause of the injury, so that the town is not liable if a third person's negligence concurred with the defect to cause the damage. 5 5 (4) The plaintiff's injury must be special or individual in the sense that it is different from the general public inconvenience caused by defective highways.' 5 6 In the usual case of personal injury or death or physical property damage, there is no question on this score. (5) Special statutory conditions must be met, such as the giving of written notice of the occurrence of injury within a short period after the accident. 5 7 Such a notice of injury is to be distinguished from the constructive notice of the defect which the municipality must have had before the accident. An occasional statute, however, has conditioned liability on written notice of the defect within a specified time before the accident.' 5 8
'o This is well illustrated by snow and ice cases where the city usually knows of the dangerous conditions while they are being created, yet where the city will be held only after a reasonable opportunity to remove or otherwise remedy the condition. Torts § 298 (1933) ; Prosser, Torts § 25 (1941) .
For general treatments of the tort liability of public officers, see Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1937) ; David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 So. Calif. L. Rev. 127, 260, 368 (1938-39) 100 (1891) , in which a health officer was held liable for destroying a horse which the board of health found diseased but which a jury later found not diseased. The Massachusetts statute involved provided neither for a hearing nor for compensation (in the event of mistake or otherwise). The English statute [2 Jac. I, c. 22 (1604) ] provided for a seizure of undried leather by searchers and then a determination of its condition by a board of expert triers. According to the pleadings (the case arose on demurrer) defendants (searchers) acted upon their good judgment but the triers found the leather dried, as in fact it was. The leather was returned to plaintiff and the action was for the seizure and detention. Defendants argued that they were under a statutory duty to act and were subject to statutory Generally a government officer is not vicariously responsible for the acts of his subordinates' 3 any more than a foreman or factory superintendent would be, though there is an exception-now possibly losing ground-in the case of sheriffs, marshals and constables who are liable for the acts of their deputies. 6 Officers' Liability. While the liability of the individual officer was said to be like that of "any other citizen," the fact that defendant was acting as a public officer or employee when he caused the injury may inject special problems into the situation that are absent in the case of an employee of private enterprise. These should first be noted, and then the special legal rules that more or less reflect them should be examined.
Special Problems of
(a) In some circumstances suit against an officer will in reality be a suit against the state, so that its allowance would circumvent the state's own immunity. This may be the case where the action is one to compel the officer to perform specifically plaintiff's contract with the government 0 5 or to gain possession of property held by the officer on penalties if they refused to seal dried leather, or sealed undried leather; that the statute contemplated the seizure of suspicious or doubtful (as well as undried) leather to protect the public interest and provided quick expert determination of the facts to protect the owner against everything but a trivial delay. The plight of the officer and the stifling inhibitory effect of strict liability were ably stressed in argument. The judgment of Ashhurst, J., briefly sums up the reasoning and conclusion of the court: "This seems to be a harsh proceeding against the defendants. They are bound to act under the terrors of a penalty; and it is hard that they should be liable in an action of trespass for a mere error in judgment; but the Legislature have not provided for such a case. The Act of Parliament only authorises the searchers to seize goods of a certain denomination; the goods in question are not of that description; therefore the seizure is illegal, and consequently the defendants are trespassers."
Miller v. Horton, supra, is analyzed and commented upon in all the authorities cited note 161 supra. Consult Schwartz, 250 et seq. ' Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888); Bowden v. Derby, 97 Me. 536, 55 Atl. 417 (1903); Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474 (1872); Dowler v. Johnson, 225 N.Y. 39, 121 N.E. 487 (1918) ; Mechem § 789. While the superior is not vicariously liable for the acts of subordinates, he may be liable for his own negligence, e.g., in failing to control acts done by a subordinate in his presence, Dowler v. Johnson, supra, or in selecting or retaining unfit subordinates (unless that is regarded as a discretionary act). Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Calif. 2d 226, 138 P. 2d 12 (1943); see Betts v. Jones, 203 N.C. 590, 166 S.E. 589 (1932) . But cf. Moye v. McLawhorn, 208 N.C. 812, 182 S.E. 493 (1935) , noted in 14 N.C. L. Rev. 307 (1936) .
" [T] he high-sheriff and under-sheriff is one officer." Cremer v. Humberston, 2 Keble 352 (K.B., 1644); Coverstone v. Davies, 227 P. 2d 300 (Calif. App., 1951) , rev'd on other grounds 38 Calif. 2d 315, 239 P. 2d 876 (1952) , typify the older view. Consult David, op. cit. supra note 161, at 140-41; Mechem § § 797-801. Contrast Michel v. Smith, 188 Calif. 199, 205 Pac. 113 (1922) (b) Suit against an officer may have the effect of directly controlling, restraining, or inhibiting governmental action. This will be true where the court is asked to compel or restrain official action. Such a situation involves problems of the proper relationship between the courts and other branches of the government, but a case of such direct (as distinguished from indirect) control or interference is rarely presented by tort suit against an officer.
(c) The private citizen has a very limited duty to act affirmatively so that he is legally free to avoid many tort risks by non-action. 167 The public officer, on the other hand, is often under a duty to take affirmative action in the public interest, and this duty is apt to be implemented by strong legal' 68 or political sanctions. This difference is often noted' 69 but its practical significance may not be as great as the frequent mention of it suggests. The individual citizen, acting on his own, is driven by strong economic and social sanctions to undertake all sorts of risk-producing endeavors, and we are inclined to welcome rather than deplore that fact. Moreover, the employee of private business is often under a very specific and direct (and sometimes legal) pressure to enter into affirmative activities. (d) Where fault is a criterion of liability, an action to enforce liability against an officer will often involve the court in a review of the propriety of legislative or executive action, since recovery would turn on a determination whether the official action involved something like an unreasonable mistake. Although a decision that it did would not entail direct interference with governmental action (as in the case of injunction or mandamus), yet both the decision and review would decree restraining a government officer from selling to others government coal which plaintiff claimed had been sold to it was held to amount to a suit against the government.
'Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945) , dealt with critically in Block, Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 Rev. (1946 .
The fact that the Larson and Mine Safety Appliances Co. decisions are controversial (consult also Davis, op. cit. supra note 161, § 232) does not concern the problems treated here.
' Consult, e.g., Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 217, 289 (1908) often involve the courts in conflicts with co6rdinate branches of the governmen° and in types of inquiry which they are not accustomed or particularly well suited to make. 1 71 This opens up the controversy over the desirable extent of judicial review of the substance of legislative or executive action. Considerations under the present head generally parallel those involved when direct interference with official action is sought, though the conflict here is perhaps less acute. Moreover, there may be situations where the courts are willing to review executive action, but not to stop it in its tracks.
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In situations where the government itself is liable on a risk theory (as in eminent domain) to those injured as a by-product of proper as well as mistaken governmental action, the present problem would be minimized. 173 (e) Under a system of governmental immunity from tort liability, the practical impact of personal liability on a government officer is very different from its impact on a private employee. To be sure, the private master's vicarious liability is theoretically secondary to the servant's direct liability, so that the master has an action over against the "wrongdoing" servant. But by and large this is pure academic theory. The master does not pursue such actions; private enterprise may redistribute its losses on this score but it does not shift them back to individual employees who cause accidents. 1 The public employee, on the other hand, must bear alone the full weight of the losses he causes unless some provision" is made to protect him by insurance, or to rei"o Cooley, Torts 377 (1st ed., 1880) ( § 298 of 4th ed., 1932); Mechem § 609; compare Jennings, op. cit. supra note 161, at 309; Schwartz 257 ("Under the doctrine of the separation of powers as applied in France the law courts may not question the regularity of administrative acts"); Street 74 (in France even the administrative court, Conseil d'Etat, has retained a doctrine of immunity for actes de gouvernement and "[miost French jurists would support the continuance of actes de gouvernement in a restricted form on the ground that it is a necessary condition of harmony between the Administration and the Judiciary; without it droit adininistratif would be intolerable to the Government"). [Vol. 22 imburse him ex gratia from the public till. 75 The upshot of all this is that personal liability will have a far greater deterrent effect-at least in some situations' 7 6 -on public officers than its shadowy counterpart has on private employees. This has a good and a bad side. On the one hand it will tend to curb high-handed official action and other bureaucratic excesses.' 77 On the other, it will often inhibit objective and fearless action and discourage responsible men from taking public employment. 78 The absence of the government's vicarious liability also means little assurance of recovery to the victim of injurious official action. Since neither his master nor his supervisor shares the officer's liability, any recovery must come from the financially weakest link in the chain. Such a principle of liability may be likened to an inverted pyramid; from a viewpoint which stresses the importance of compensation and wide distribution of losses among the beneficiaries of the enterprise that causes them, the present system is well-nigh the worst that can be imagined.
All in all, the traditional Anglo-American system of state immunity coupled with the officer's liability may well be appraised in Professor Robson's words:
The liability of the individual official for wrongdoing committed in the course of his duty on which so much praise has been bestowed by English writers, is ' There are occasional statutes providing that a governmental unit indemnify or purchase liability insurance to protect certain specified classes of public servants. See, e.g., Rittmiler v. School Dist. No. 84, 104 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn., 1952) ; Govel v. Board of Education, 267 App. Div. 621, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 299 (3d Dep't, 1944 ), aff'd 293 N.Y. 928, 60 N.E. 2d 133 (1944 ; Warp, op. cit. supra note 84, at 372.
There are also occasional statutory provisions authorizing a municipality to reimburse specified classes of employees for personal judgments rendered against them because of specified kinds of official activity. See Fuller & Casner, op. cit. supra note 72, at 451 et seq.
1"I have often taken the position that the deterrent effect of tort liability on individuals has been greatly overrated. Consult, e.g., James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950) . With respect to individual conduct in an accident, or other crisis, situation, I am convinced that is true. Where, however, the action concerned involves a deliberate and thought-out choice (such as that to enter public service, or the typical legislative or administrative decision), the case probably stands quite differently (as the text assumes). Consult text at p. 652 infra.
'Laski, Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 458 (1919); Jennings, op. cit. supra note 161, at 270; Schwartz 264, 265. But compare Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 161, at 300 (suggesting that "the chief difference between" courts and administrative tribunals in this respect "is, perhaps, that the possibility of such oppression is frequently mentioned in connection with the administrative tribunals, while the possibility of oppression in courts is conventionally ignored").
18This is conceded by all hands. Schwartz 263; Street 15.
essentially a relic from past centuries when government was in the hands of a few prominent, independent and substantial persons, so-called Public Officers, who were in no way responsible to ministers or elected legislatures or councils .... Such a doctrine is utterly unsuited to the twentieth-century state, in which the Public Officer has been superseded by armies of anonymous and obscure civil servants, acting directly under the orders of their superiors, who are ultimately responsible to an elected body. The exclusive liability of the individual officer is a doctrine typical of a highly individual common law. It is of decreasing value today.
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2. Special Rules Governing Officers' Liabilities. The problems and considerations just described have left their mark on the rules governing the liability of officers. The courts have tended in recent years to build up a larger and larger area of privilege or immunity for the officer with respect to his official conduct. It remains to examine these rules.
(a) Suit against the officer will sometimes be regarded as one against the state, 8 0 a notion which may affect the court's jurisdiction as well as the officer's liability. This rule has little application to the tort damage suit against an officer, and need not concern us here.
(b) In order to prevent direct interference by the courts with action by co~rdinate branches of the government, a doctrine has developed that injunction or prerogative writ will not issue to compel or forbid a public officer to do an act which by constitution or statute is discretionary, or to act in any certain way when the law gives him discretion as to the means.""' If, on the other hand, the law commands or forbids the officer to do that act, then his function with regard to it is ministerial and his duty will be enforced by appropriate court process. 8 2 (c) The most important limitation upon the tort liability of public officers in America today is unfortunately couched in the same terms asthe very different rule (just described) governing the issuance of an injunction or prerogative writ. Where official action or non-action involves the exercise of discretion, and is not merely ministerial, the officer is not liable for the injurious consequences of that action even if it was taken negligently or (under some decisions) maliciously; where the action is ministerial only, the officer will be liable if it is otherwise tortious and not justifiable as commanded by valid statute, [ Vol. 22 order, etc.' This broad privilege for discretionary or quasi-judicial acts was developed in actions against judicial officers 84 but has been extended by the weight of American case law to legislative 8 5 and a host of administrative 8 6 officers. The two main groups of considera-tions 187 upon which such a rule and its extension are to be justified differ from each other, though they partially overlap. The dangers of confusion inherent in such a situation are obvious-especially where the terminology associated with the rule is also freely used as a guide for applying other rules which involve some but not all of these considerations. 8 8 Careful examination is therefore in order.
Where the suit calls upon the courts to review the propriety of legislative or administrative action, questions of the proper relationship between co6rdinate branches of government are encountered. This occurs most clearly where the official action is legislative or political in character, or where it is regulatory action in which the officer must make a decision in much the same way as a judge or jury does. Thus the legislator who casts the deciding vote for the imposition or repeal of a tariff or other tax is not liable to one injured by the action, in part at least because the courts will refrain from passing judgment on whether the action should be regarded as an unreasonable mistake or even as a mistake at all. 189 The same thing would be true of an administrative decision (authorized by law) to fix a tariff rate, or the support price for an agricultural commodity, or to ration stoves during wartime.' 0 Similar situations are presented by a decision to enter into a given flood-control project,' 9 ' or to erect an army camp.' 9 2 Moreover, the basis for judicial unwillingness to review such actions would exist fully as much in situations where damages are sought directly against the state as where damages are sought against the officer.' 9 3
In addition to them the policy of repose is occasionally suggested. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 (1871) ; Street 41 ("it is contrary to public policy that litigants should reopen suits by bringing personal actions against [those?] deciding them"). See Jennings, op. cit. supra note 161, at 271 (reason 5). Where the official action followed a trial or other examination of subject matter in which the present party was a participant (as in Bradley's case) this may deserve consideration. In other types of situations this factor is rarely, if ever, mentioned.
' Thus there are situations wherein courts are willing to review the propriety of official conduct (because it does not involve discretion), but not to stop it in its tracks. ' Suits which would test any such proposition are scarcely ever brought, perhaps because the proposition is scarcely to be doubted. In Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109 (1877), a city councilman was sued because of legislative action which abolished plaintiff's office. Malice was alleged. Plaintiff got short shrift. 'If, that is, liability is put on a fault basis. If liability were put on a risk basis the present difficulty would not be encountered in the same form although the question would
Wherever suit is brought against an individual officer because of his official conduct, the court must consider the practical effects of liability and make a value judgment between the social and individual benefit from compensation to the victim, together with the wholesome deterrence of official excess, on the one hand; and on the other, the evils that would flow from inhibiting courageous and independent official action, and deterring responsible citizens from entering public life. The rule of immunity of officers for discretionary acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer (especially since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim from that source is slight) are outweighed by the evils that would flow from a wider rule of liability. To the extent that this value judgment is valid, and I believe it is, it is broadly applicable to official conduct, and not merely to situations presenting questions of conflict between codrdinate branches of government or the desirable scope of judicial review. There are a good many situations in which the last-mentioned questions are not present, yet where the considerations which call for the personal immunity of the officer-at least if he acts honestly and in good faith-apply fully. For instance, when Fisher sued Judge Bradley' 9 4 for damages for his allegedly wrongful disbarment, only a single branch of the government was involved in all phases of the matter. Moreover, the courts often interfere with legislative or executive action. They will declare statutes or regulations unconstitutional; they will determine whether a regulation goes beyond the statutory authority claimed to support it; they will decide whether administrative action in specific cases is warranted by what they (the courts) judge to be the proper interpretation of a valid regulation or statute, and sometimes whether administrative findings of fact may be supported.' 9 5 But if personal liability may be visited upon officers who remain as to how far society should insure against the injurious consequences of political decisions. And the influence of the administrative branch of the government will probably always be thrown against extending its liability as insurer. Authorities cited note 170 supra.
= 'Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871 have acted in accordance with their apparent commands and their best judgment in these matters, we are indeed likely to breed a race of donothing officials. The tendency is to protect the officer by regarding his function as quasi-judicial or discretionary." 0 6 There is still another class of cases which do not present any acute question of intragovernmental conflict but do call for the officer's immunity from personal liability on the grounds presently under consideration. Governments engage in many projects which involve functions not at all regulatory or political in their nature but calling for the exercise of judgment or discretion by the officials employed to carry them out. In the execution of a floodcontrol project, for example, someone must decide upon the size of the charges to be used in blasting.
197 If ammonium nitrate on hand after the war is to be shipped abroad for the agricultural rehabilitation of our allies, someone must decide how it is to be prepared and shipped and whether there is need to investigate its dangerous propensities.
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If willows in an experimental area are to be eradicated, someone must choose the herbicide and the means of applying it. 99 While all the types of cases described in the last paragraph involve considerations which would protect the officer from personal liability, it does not follow, nor is it true, that these considerations would be applicable to the same extent if liability were put upon the government iather than the officer. However impolitic it was to make Horton pay for Miller's horse, there may be excellent reasons why the community should pay for it. But more of this later. The American rule today, then, is that judicial, legislative, and ad- [Vol. 22 ministrative officers are not generally liable for the injurious consequences of discretionary action or non-action."' And the tendency has been to define the concept of discretionary or quasi-judicial action broadly in favor of immunity. 0 ' Limitations on this rule of privilege or immunity should now be noted.
Two doctrines which are losing favor cut right athwart the reasoning in favor of privilege: the "jurisdictional facts" doctrine and the notion that an unconstitutional statute affords no protection to one acting under it."° The latter doctrine is self-explanatory; the former views the officer's statutory powers as extending to situations wherein the court finds the facts and interprets the statute so that the one fits into the other. An example of such reasoning may be found in Miller v. Horton,°0 described above. It has been perhaps most often used where there was a physical trespass upon property. Even today if the officer acts clearly outside the authority conferred on him by statute, regulation, or process, he is liable for the injurious consequences of his conduct. "Thus, if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates ..., should proceed to try parties for public offenses ... ," the judge would be liable. But the notion today is recognized that an officer generally has the duty and the power to determine whether he has jurisdiction-or, to emphasize it, that he has jurisdiction to determine even mistakenly that he has jurisdiction-unless the facts and the law are so clear as not to present an issue challenging "judicable inquiry. ' 2 6 And statutes are 'See Schwartz 254; Davis, op. cit Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.V. 942 (1904) . The failure to provide for any hearing and for any alternative means of compensating the victim of official mistake also played a part in Miller v. Horton, supra. See various treatments of case in authorities cited note 161 supra, especially Jennings, at 281 et seq. 'Field, J., in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871) . In this case the distinction was formulated as one between "excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter," ibid., at 351, and this is the language in which it is usually described.
I Consult, e.g., Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 Col. L. Rev. 1006 (1940) .
generally interpreted in the light of this prevailing notion. Today most courts would probably find that Varley was justified in seizing "suspicious" leather and Horton in destroying an apparently infected horse even under the statutes involved in those cases.1 07 There are still situations, however, where the officer acts at his peril, as where a sheriff seizes the property of B reasonably believing it to be the property of A against whom he has a writ of attachment; 2 0 or where a fiscal officer invests or expends public funds." 9 The policies which justify these results are certainly not revealed by terming the officers' acts ministerial, as the courts do. Most tasks of a clerical 210 or manual 211 nature are classed as ministerial though they too involve the exercise of judgment. There is conflict in the cases where the officer is charged with improper motive or malice (yet acts within the scope of his official capacity). Judges are generally protected 212 and the federal rule extends this protection to administrative officials. 21 8 Older state cases also followed this tendency, 2 14 but the more recent cases perhaps reveal a trend in the other direction.
21
" The justification for absolute privilege here is obviously not to protect officers who have in fact acted wilfully and maliciously, and if it were possible in practice to bring such complaints only against the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been See, e.g., Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883) 'See, e.g., Bird v. McGoldrick, 277 N.Y. 492, 14 N.E. 2d 805 (1938) tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
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The case for conditional privilege is often rested on arguments that assume the presence of malice in the individual case, and so fail to meet Judge Hand's point cleanly; 217 yet perhaps they suggest a flaw in it in spite of that. Where the charge is one of honest mistake we exempt the officer because we deem that an actual holding of liability would have worse consequences than the possibility of an actual mistake (which under the circumstances we are willing to condone). But it is stretching the argument pretty far to say that the mere inquiry into malice would have worse consequences than the possibility of actual malice (which we would not, for a minute, condone). Since the danger that official power will be abused is greatest where motives are improper, the balance here may well swing the other way.
It is often said that while an official may be held liable for the injurious consequences of misfeasance or malfeasance, liability cannot be grounded on nonfeasance. 1 8 Of course, if the officer has discretion to do an act or not, his choice will be protected by the discretion rule. If a distinction in favor of non-action is carried any further than this, it would surely dampen the ardor and initiative of officialdom. Few cases can be found to make the distinction where the choice between action and non-action is regarded as ministerial, and therefore reviewable under the discretion rule. 219 About half our states have statutes making a political subdivision liable for mob violence, 2 4 more or less after the manner of the old English Riot Acts. 2 23 Other statutes provide a fairly effective substitute for governmental liability by authorizing or requiring a governmental unit to purchase liability insurance either for its own protection or to indemnify its employees for their personal liability. 2 2 6 Except in New York, 22 7 there seems to be no statute providing broadly for the tort liability of the political subdivisions of a state.
As to the liability of the state itself, there are several types of provisions. Here again some statutes create liability for torts in connection with certain activities, such as the operation of state-owned motor vehicles 228 or the maintenance of state highways . 2 9 Other statutes, of more general application, set up a board to investigate claims and recommend action upon them to the legislature. 3 0 New York has waived immunity broadly and set up a special court to make determinations of liability (under general tort principles) which are binding except as reversed or modified in the course of judicial appeal. 3 ' For a brief period (1943 ' For a brief period ( -1945 Michigan statutes provided for a waiver nearly as broad. 2 Within the past decade Congress too, after experimenting with piecemeal legislation of the kind described above, enacted a broad waiver of the immunity of the federal government by the Tort Claims Act of 1946.233 This act extends only to claims for money on account of property damage, personal injury, or death caused by the negligence or wrongful act of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury or death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
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It will be seen that the statute apparently chooses the fault basis of liability. But it does not embrace the fault principle fully. The Act contains explicit exceptions, of which some exclude even liability for fault in connection with specified activities, 2 35 and others exclude liability for certain kinds of faults, such as deliberate torts 2 3 8 and negligence in the exercise of a discretionary function. 3 recently treated these exceptions in some detail elsewhere. 242 Here an appraisal will be attempted of the net effect of the Act in terms of the objectives of tort law and the limitations on liability which are peculiarly appropriate when the government is the defendant. Except possibly for some of the excluded activities, the most important reservation in the Act has turned out to be that contained in Section 2680(a) .243 This excludes liability for claims based upon either (1) " the act or omission of an employee ... exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid"; or (2) "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion be abused."
This section, it is submitted, is an ill-conceived and poorly thoughtout attempt to solve some of the most sensitive problems concerning the proper limits of governmental liability. Apparently the limitations that have developed for the tort liability of public officers were bor-rowed and transplanted bodily into this new and different field. But it would be a surprising thing if rules that developed under the shadow -and in large part because of the shadow 2 44 -of governmental immunity would all be suitable under conditions where that shadow has been largely removed. Indeed, where the government is liable the situation has been quite dramatically reversed, by providing in effect that the employee or official is not personally liable at all, 245 thus producing a pattern of liability which resembles (in this particular) that obtaining in France for fautes de service. 4 This does not mean that all the rules of immunity for officers are necessarily unsuitable in the new context, but it does call for a careful appraisal of the extent to which the policies behind them validly support continued governmental immunity.
In the case of officers, we noted that they are immune from liability even for fault in the exercise of discretionary functions. When a legislative or political decision is involved, this immunity is justified in part by a judicial unwillingness to review the propriety of actions which under our form of government are committed to coordinate branches of that government, 47 and a commendable judicial desire to avoid unseemly intragovernmental conflict. We also observed that the same problem will be present where an attempt is made to predicate the liability of the government itself on fault in the making of such a decision; 248 and without much doubt the courts would refuse to put liability on such a basis even if the Act were silent on the subject. 2 4 Perhaps the second clause of section 2680(a) was not meant to go any further than this; for Congress was told that the section did no more than the courts would probably do without it.Y5 0 But if this was the intention, it is most unfortunate that language was chosen that had become associated with the law of liability of public officers, for as we have seen the officer is personally immune from liability for negligence in large areas of "discretionary" activity which the courts are perfectly willing and quite competent to review. 51 Immunity here rests on the entirely different basis that personal liability would keep responsible people from entering public life and would prevent officials from the objective and courageous performance of their functions. It remains to be determined whether these considerations apply to any extent when governmental liability is involved. It must be adniitted at the outset that not nearly enough critical thought, and almost nothing in the way of scientific study, has been given to the deterrent effects of tort liability.
52 Nevertheless we must try to appraise as well as we may the probable effect of transferriing potential liability from the officer to the government. It seems fairly clear that this will at least remove any obstacle which personal liability might put in the way of entering public life. Responsible men are no more unlikely to enter government service than private service because of the fear of their employer's tort liabilities. But that is only part of the story. It is not equally clear that the government's liability might not tend to throttle fearless discretionary action-surely administrators often have a weather eye cocked for the departmental budget. Yet the unwholesome effect of this sort of thing is most pronounced where the decision to be made is of a regulatory or political character, such as a decision of the SEC, or a broad policy decision to enter into a government project, or to locate it in one area rather than another. When it comes to the host of decisions which call for judgment in executing or carrying out these projects (such as the examples given on page 644 above), the effect upon officers of their employer's liability for their negligence might well be a wholesome one tending to make them careful rather than craven. After all, it would only bid them weigh the alternative ways of carrying out the enterprise in very much the same way as employees in private ventures do all the time. There seems, therefore, to be no justification on the present score for exempting government from liability for the negligence of its employees in exercising their judgment, except where the challenged conduct involves a legislative or regulatory decision, or one of broad government policy.
Consult pp. 643-44 supra. For attempts that merely scratch the surface see James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 Yale L. J. 549 (1948) ; James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950) . Consult also notes 128 and 176 supra.
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TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
The problem of deterrence is presented in a different context by the exclusion of government liability for its employees' deliberate torts. Here, on the whole, deterrence appears in benign garb as a guardian against abuses by officialdom, though the problem gets complex where libel and slander are concerned since inhibitions in that field inevitably curb some freedom of speech.
25 3 Matters of speech aside, the pertinent question is whether governmental liability will add to or detract from the wholesome deterrence of personal liability. Even if the government alone were liable, the increased spur to stern discipline over officers might more than offset the increased irresponsibility that would flow from personal immunity--especially since the officer's financial situation is rarely such as to warrant suit against him. But even if that were not so, legislation could easily preserve the officer's primary liability in the case of wilful torts; and a rigorous administrative policy of enforcing such primary liability 2 54 would add the force of one deterrent to another.
Even where liability would not be an unwanted deterrence, the question remains of the extent to which it is desirable to compensate out of public funds those injured by what government does in the public interest. The older view chose to sacrifice the individual claim altogether, except within the narrow confines of a taking of property in the constitutional sense. But the whole trend of modern thinking is toward compensating the victims of enterprise and distributing their losses. Even conservatives would do this where the victim is innocent, where his injury is of a kind already recognized in private tort law, and where there is fault in conducting the enterprise. The device of government liability offers machinery for both compensation and distribution; it should be used to compensate the victims of government at least to the full extent of the fault principle except in situations where there are cogent reasons of extrinsic policy for withholding compensation. These reasons exist for legislative and other political decisions, but not elsewhere unless the possible magnitude of claims be thought a reason, as it may have been in the Texas City disaster litiga-"Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Edgerton, J., in Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F. 2d 457, 458 (App. D.C., 1942) . See also sources collected in Shulman and James, Cases and Materials on Torts 950-1007 (2d ed.,
1952).
Such as that apparently pursued just recently by the government in the case of ordinary negligence, with far less (if any) justification. Consult Government Recovery of Indemnity from Negligent Employees: A New Federal Policy, 63 Yale L. J. 570 (1954) .
Presumably this practice ended with United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
tion.
2 55 But where such claims represent the kind of injury courts conventionally recognize-especially physical injury, as in that casetheir magnitude simply reflects the size of the injury which large-scale and perhaps increasingly dangerous 25 6 activity by government may inflict on its citizens. It would change the essential picture only when the liability was so crushing that it reflected wholesale destruction of the social wealth in a way that would spell a breakdown for any system of liability.
57 After all, England socialized the losses from German bombings during the last war, 2 58 and we were prepared to do the same.
259
A deeper question is whether government liability should be limited by the fault principle. If Miller's healthy horse is killed because a board of health mistakenly thinks it is diseased, 2 60 why should Miller's compensation by the community depend on whether or not the mistake was reasonable? His injury is the same in either event and is a more or less inevitable result (given the likelihood of human failings) of activity carried on for the community's benefit. There is perhaps increasing recognition of a principle which would make this a basis of enterprise liability, 261 without any regard to fault. Such a principle has found expression in constitutional guaranties of compensation where there is an exercise of eminent domain, 26 2 and in workmen's compensa-: Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953) .
Consider the possibilities opened up by the prospect of continued development of atomic weapons.
In other cases the language of Lord Holt is apt: "But it is objected, that there will be a multiplication of actions. I answer, so there ought; for if one will multiply injuries, it is fit the actions for the same should be multiplied .... ." Ashby v. White, 6 Mod. 45, 54 (K.B., 1703) . ' See Report by Prime Minister Churchill to Parliament on the Progress of the War, October 9, 1940 [as reported in N.Y. Times § 1, p. 4, col. 4 (Oct. 9, 1940) ], quoted in Shulman and James, op. cit. supra n. 253, at 59-60.
Compare also the Fort of the Double-Crown case wherein the French Conseil d'Etat awarded damages to those injured by the explosion of a large ammunition dump on the outskirts of Paris during the First World War. Consult Schwartz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1432 Rev. , 1434 Rev. et seq. (1954 .
56 Stat. 175, 176 (1942) , 15 U.S.C.A. 606b-1, 606b-2, 609 q. (1948) (act providing for damage insurance).
'0 See note 162 supra. Cf. Schwartz 274; note 261 infra (compensation for the convicted innocent). ' See authorities cited in note 1 supra; consult also Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952) ; Feezer, A Circle Tour through Negligence, ibid., at 647.
One situation in which the risk theory ought to be, and occasionally is, recognized is that where compensation is sought for the death or imprisonment of innocent persons mistakenly convicted of crime. Consult Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal justice, 21 B.U.L. Rev. 201 (1941) ; Street 44. For the influence of the eminent domain principle on the development of a risk theory in French droit administratif, see Schwartz 269 et seq. [Vol. 22 
